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Abstract
The present paper seeks to explain the pattern of income redis-
tribution in a globalised world of increased market income inequality
and lower costs of factor mobility. In some countries, larger market
income inequality has been met by an increased redistributive eﬀort,
thus keeping the distribution of disposable incomes relatively stable.
In other countries, larger market inequality has been accompanied by
a reduction in transfers, thus leading to growth in disposable income
inequality. In our model, the initial level of market income inequality
is crucial in explaining how an increase in this variable aﬀects redis-
tribution.
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1 Introduction
Income inequality has increased in most OECD countries during the last
decades, as documented by for instance Atkinson (2003) and Gottschalk and
Smeeding (1997). In some countries, redistribution programs have been rel-
atively successful in reducing the impact of lower wages or unemployment
on people’s disposable incomes. In other countries, the increase in market
income inequality has led to a sharp increase also in disposable income in-
equality.
Consider, for instance, the United States and Canada. Both countries
have experienced significant increases in market income inequality during the
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1980s and 1990s. In the United States, this development was accompanied by
an increase in the inequality of disposable incomes of a similar magnitude,
whereas Canada managed to keep the distribution of disposable incomes
stable through active redistribution policies, at least until the mid-1990s.1
Since then, Canada has also seen a sharp increase in both pre-tax and post-
tax income inequality.
In Europe, comparing the United Kingdom and Finland, we find a similar
development. In the United Kingdom, there has been a significant increase
in both market income inequality and disposable income inequality in the
1980s and 1990s. Like Canada, Finland managed for a while to stabilize
the distribution of disposable incomes despite an increase in market income
inequality. However, since the mid-1990s, the disposable income inequality
has increased also in Finland.2
It is interesting to note that Canada has a lower level of market income
inequality than the United States. The same is true for Finland compared
to the United Kingdom. Is this a coincidence? The quality of data makes
it diﬃcult to give a definite answer to this question. As emphasized by
Atkinson (2003), diﬀerent definitions of income across countries and changes
in definitions within countries over time, make an international comparison of
income inequality and redistribution across countries over time very diﬃcult.
The present paper approaches the question from a theoretical angle, asking:
Is there a reason to believe that countries with diﬀerent levels of pre-tax
inequality would respond diﬀerently to increases in pre-tax inequality?
The starting point of our explanation is the eﬀects of globalisation. Glob-
alisation, in the form of increased competition from low-wage countries and
technological advances in information and communication technology, raises
the demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers in developed
economies.3 In this way, globalisation is often viewed as the main cause of ris-
1From 1981 to 1994, the market income Gini-coeﬃcient for Canada increased from 0.38
to 0.43. The disposable income Gini coeﬃcient, however, remained stable at 0.29 in this
time period. From 1979 to 1994, the market income Gini-coeﬃcient for the United States
increased from 0.41 to 0.47. The Gini for disposable income increased from 0.3 to 0.36.
(Ruiz-Huerta et al, 1999, Table 5, page 20-21). See also Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997)
table 4, page 666, for changes in market and disposable income inequality for a selection
of countries in the 1980s.
2For the development in income inequality in the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom and Finland, see Atkinson, 2003, in particular Tables 1, 2, 3, and 6.
3Feenstra and Hanson (1999) show that technological change, rather than trade or
migration, is the main cause of rising inequality in market incomes in the United States.
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ing inequality in market incomes. Globalisation is also associated with growth
in international production networks. This has contributed to increased in-
ternational demand for managers, and an increase in their earnings. The fact
that upper-level employees working in multinational companies fairly easily
can choose country of residency without leaving the firm makes these people
more mobile. The expansion of scale associated with globalisation may also
pave the ground for “superstars”, i.e. the highest skilled people, who increase
their market shares and rents at the expense of the earnings of the second
best performers (Rosen, 1981). This, too, may explain why globalisation
causes more income inequality.
Globalisation also poses a challenge to national taxation and redistribu-
tion programs. The increase in factor mobility and improved communication
systems make tax bases more mobile, thus limiting the ability of countries
to implement ambitious redistribution programs. There is a widespread per-
ception in many developed countries that their welfare states are threatened
by globalisation, and that governments have lost much of their freedom of
manoeuvre.
Wildasin (2003), discussing the impact of economic integration on redis-
tribution, emphasizes the eﬀect of integration on the mobility of the highly
skilled, highly paid workers. By choosing residency, a worker can often choose
where to pay taxes. Since the taxation of highly-compensated workers ac-
counts for a very large fraction of tax revenues, the fiscal implications of
such relocation can be very high. The importance of high-income tax payers
for the total tax income in developed countries can be illustrated by some
numbers from the United States. In 1999, one-fifth of personal income taxes
were paid by only 0.16 percent of the taxpayers; the top 2 percent of the
taxpayers paid over 40 percent of all personal income taxes. The presence or
absence of these high income taxpayers is thus a matter of great importance
to the US tax system.
In the present paper we take globalisation and its eﬀect on market income
inequality as given. Our focus is on how the redistributive eﬀort is aﬀected
by a given change in market income inequality. Globalisation is assumed
to aﬀect the mobility of the tax base through two channels. First, there is
a direct eﬀect: Globalisation means increased factor mobility and thereby
increased mobility of the tax base. Second, there is an indirect eﬀect: Glob-
alisation leads to a greater concentration of income, which in turn reduces
the relative importance of mobility costs for tax payers.
The central result of our model is that redistributive tax rates are high-
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est for intermediate levels of pre-tax inequality. In other words, the level of
taxation and redistribution is a hump-shaped function of pre-tax inequality.
Hence, the model predicts that for a country like Canada, starting with a rel-
atively low level of pre-tax income inequality, the policy response to increased
market income inequality is first to implement more ambitious redistribution
programs to reduce the impact of globalisation on disposable incomes. As
the process of globalisation and increased inequality in market incomes con-
tinues, however, the policy response will at some point be reversed. The less
ambitious redistribution program will then cause disposable income inequal-
ities to rise sharply. For a country like the United States, however, starting
with a higher level of market income inequality, the prediction of the model is
that an increase in inequality will be associated with a reduction in transfers
and hence a sharp increase in disposable income inequality.
We also show that globalisation in the form of lower mobility costs may
lead to larger international diﬀerences in tax rates and redistribution. This
result runs contrary to the commonly held view that globalization represents
a particularly strong challenge for countries with high tax rates, and therefore
is a force of harmonization of tax rates across countries.
Our study is related to theoretical work seeking to explain what is some-
times called the “redistribution puzzle”. This puzzle refers to the observation
that countries with a high degree of pre-tax income inequality typically have
fairly limited redistribution programs, in many cases less redistribution than
in countries with a higher degree of pre-tax equality (Perotti, 1996; Bassett
et al., 1999). In Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2003) we oﬀer one explanation to
the link between inequality and redistribution, arguing that inequality may
create residential segregation, which in turn may aﬀect people’s preferences
for redistribution. Moene and Wallerstein (2001) point to a diﬀerent mecha-
nism, emphasizing the role of tax and transfer programs as a form of publicly
financed insurance. If insurance is a normal good, then more inequality may
lead to less taxation, as the median voter becomes poorer and therefore de-
mands less publicly financed insurance. In contrast to these articles inspired
by the cross-country evidence on inequality and redistribution, the focus of
the present paper is on explaining the development of income inequality and
redistribution over time.
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2 The model
Consider a country populated by n people. Income levels diﬀer, perhaps
because of diﬀerences in talents and skills. Some people in the economy,
measured by p, are poor. For simplicity, we assume that the poor have no
income at all, and hence are dependent on transfers to meet their needs. The
remaining part of the population, n − p, have positive incomes. Income is
uniformly distributed amongst the income earners. We rank people in an
increasing order according to their income, so that the nth person is the
richest individual, with an income given by ymax. Aggregate income in the
economy is given by Y . The maximum income can then be written as:
ymax =
2Y
n− p. (1)
The number of poor, p, is our measure of pre-tax inequality. For p =
0, which represents the most egalitarian pre-tax income distribution in our
model, ymax = 2Y/n = 2y, i.e. a situation where the richest individual has
twice the average income (y). For p > 0, income distribution will be skewed
to the left for the population as a whole. The income of a person ni > p is
a fraction (ni − p) / (n− p) of the maximum income. Hence, we can express
the income of individual i as
yi =
2Y (ni−p)
(n−p)2 for ni > p
0 for ni ≤ p
. (2)
People make two choices. First, they vote on tax policy. Second, respond-
ing to diﬀerences in taxes at home and abroad, people may decide to relocate
to a low-tax country in order to reduce their tax bills. For concreteness, we
shall in the remainder refer to the tax base as labor income and mobility
of the tax base as migration of people. The mechanisms we highlight are,
however, also relevant for the case of capital taxation and capital mobility.
The median voter is given by nm = n/2, and from (2) we see that her income,
ym, is
ym =
2Y (n2−p)
(n−p)2 for
n
2
> p
0 for n
2
≤ p
. (3)
The gap between the median income and average income increases with
inequality up to the point where the median voter has zero income, i.e. where
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p = n/2. Increasing inequality beyond this point does not aﬀect the gap
between average and median income.
The redistribution program consists of a linear income tax, t ∈ (0, 1), and
a uniform transfer, T . Only residents of the country pay taxes and receive
transfers. The per capita (where by “capita” we refer to the number of people
living in the country) tax base is given by yˆ, which may be lower than or
equal to y, depending on whether there is an exodus of the tax base or not.
A deadweight loss drives a wedge between what is collected in taxes and
what is left for redistribution. We make the standard assumption that the
dead weight loss is a positive function of the tax rate. The transfer that each
person receives is given by
T = tyˆ(1− bt), (4)
where b is a parameter that captures the importance of the dead weight
loss in taxation. Since the median voter’s contribution to the redistribution
program is given by tym, her post-tax disposable income, Im, can be expressed
as
Im = (1− t)ym + T. (5)
The equilibrium tax rate is the one that maximizes Im. The focus of
the present analysis is the relation between pre-tax income distribution and
redistribution. Income inequality aﬀects the equilibrium tax rate through two
channels. First, by aﬀecting the gap between the average and the median
income. Second, by aﬀecting the mobility of the tax base. We start by
studying a situation with no international mobility in order to describe the
first mechanism.
2.1 Autarky
Under autarky, the per capita tax base is equal to the average pre-tax income,
y. From (4) we know that in this case, T = ty(1−bt). The objective function
of the median voter (5) can then be expressed as:
Im = (1− t)ym + ty(1− bt). (6)
The median voter’s optimal choice of tax rate in autarky, t∗a, can be found
by maximizing Im in (6) with respect to t, and using the definition of ym in
(3), which results in:
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t∗a =
min( p
2
2b(p−n)2 , 1) if p ≤
n
2
min( 1
2b
, 1) if p > n
2
. (7)
Clearly, irrespective of whether the median voter has a positive market
income or not, i.e. whether p is larger than or smaller than n/2, the equilib-
rium tax in autarky is a non-decreasing function of inequality; ∂t∗a/∂p ≥ 0.
Intuitively, for low values of p, the median voter’s income is not much higher
than the average income. Hence, her benefit from the redistribution program
is modest. Given the dead weight loss from redistribution, she votes for low
taxes. As p increases, the median voter’s income, and thus her contribution
to the redistribution program, falls, and there is more to gain from redis-
tributive taxes. The vote will then be for a higher tax rate. Obviously, the
higher is the dead weight loss parameter b, the lower is the tax rate.
The result that the higher the gap between average and median income,
the higher is equilibrium taxes, is not surprising. Indeed, this result can be
found in standard median voter models of taxation, see for instance Roberts
(1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), that describe the median solution
when the eﬀect of taxes on incentives to work are taken into account. A
similar result can be derived from welfare maximization in the optimal tax
literature, see Sandmo (1976).
2.2 Open economy
We now allow for international mobility and thus introduce the second con-
straint on redistributive taxation, namely mobility of the tax base. Before
any migration of labor takes place, people vote on income taxes. Hence, the
entire population takes part in the vote.
Emigration means that income will be registered abroad and hence sub-
jected only to foreign taxes, but emigrants are also excluded from the transfer
program in their home country. We simplify by assuming that there are zero
taxes and no transfers abroad.4 Changing residency involves a fixed relo-
cation cost m.5 Note that m may well be a function of globalisation: A
reduction in the barriers to factor mobility is likely to reduce m.
4We do not endogenise the tax policy of the tax haven, and therefore do not analyse
issues related to tax competition in this model.
5Emigration in our model is a legal form of tax evasion. The tax evasion literature
also typically operates with a fixed evasion cost, for instance tied to loss of reputation if
cought. See for instance Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
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A fixed mobility cost captures in the simplest possible way the key as-
sumption that the relative importance of mobility costs falls with income.
A concentration of income thus increases the elasticity of the tax base. The
important assumption, however, is not that mobility costs are entirely fixed,
but that migration costs as a fraction of total income decreases with income.
Thus, our model does not preclude the possibility that migration costs in-
crease with income, as long as this increase is less than proportional. An
income earner is indiﬀerent between paying the tax or moving when
m = tyi, (8)
from which we can derive the pre-tax income of the marginal taxpayer,
yˆmax, as
yˆmax = min(
m
t
, ymax), (9)
with ymax defined in (1). If the tax rate is set such that t > m/ymax,
some high-income people in the economy will choose to leave the country.
In this case, yˆmax = m/t. Define the marginal tax payer, i.e. the one with
income equal to m/t, as nˆ. Clearly, if t ≤ m/ymax, then yˆmax = y and nˆ = n.
Substituting for (2) in (8), the marginal tax payer can be identified as:
nˆ =
m
t
(n−p)2
2Y
+ p for t ≥ m/ymax
n for t < m/ymax
. (10)
Rearranging (1), the average income in the economy can be expressed as
yˆ = yˆ
max(nˆ−p)
2nˆ
, where (nˆ− p) is the number of tax payers in the economy.
Using this information together with (10), we find the per capita tax base as
a function of the tax rate as:
yˆ =
m2(n−p)2
2mt(n−p)2+4pt2Y for t ≥ m/y
max
y for t < m/ymax
. (11)
Since T = tyˆ(1− bt), (5) can now be expressed as:
Im = (1− t)ym + tyˆ(1− bt). (12)
It is clear from (12) and the definition of yˆ in (11), that the disposable
income of the median voter is a negative function of the tax rate as long as
t > m/ymax. Intuitively, the reason is that out-migration of the tax base
is very costly since the richest people are the ones to leave first, and these
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are also the people who contribute the most to the redistribution program.
Hence, an increase in t leads to a reduction in T .
It is therefore evident that the open economy optimal tax rate in the
present model framework is never set at a level that causes an out-migration
of labor. In other words, the optimal tax rate will satisfy the condition
t ≤ m/ymax. Since income in the economy is fixed in equilibrium, it also
clear that there is a one-to-one relation between the tax rate and the level of
redistribution in the economy: A higher tax rate means more redistribution, a
lower tax rate means less redistribution. Using (1), the condition t ≤ m/ymax
can be expressed as:
t ≤ m (n− p)
2Y
≡ t∗c . (13)
When (13) is satisfied, nˆ = n and yˆ = y, and the objective function of the
median voter given by (12) is exactly as in the autarky situation, given by
(6). The maximization problem can therefore be seen as choosing t∗a, defined
by (7), as long as t∗a ≤ t∗c . If t∗a ≥ t∗c, the condition in (13) holds with equality,
and the optimal tax rate is given by t∗c . More formally, the equilibrium tax
rate in the economy is given by:
t∗ = min(t∗a, t
∗
c). (14)
The critical level of p where t∗a = t
∗
c can be expressed as
6:
p∗ = n− t
∗
a2Y
m
(15)
Figure 1 illustrates the tax rate as a function of our measure of pre-tax
inequality p.
To the left of p∗, the tax rate increases with higher pre-tax inequality, to
the the right of p∗, the tax rate falls. To the left of p∗, the dead weight loss is
the binding constraint, and the tax rate follows the upward sloping t∗a-curve.
An increase in the tax rate is possible here without causing relocation of
the richest people in the economy, but the dead weight loss constraint limits
the median voter’s eagerness to implement ambitious tax and redistribution
programs. To the right of p∗, the downward sloping t∗c-line is the binding
constraint. A higher tax would clearly not be chosen since, as argued above,
this would cause out-migration of the richest tax payers and therefore lower
6The critical level of income inequality, p∗, exists and is unique since t∗a is non-decreasing
in p and m(n−p)2Y is non-increasing in p.
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Figure 1: Inequality and redistribution
disposable income for the people remaining in the country, including the
median voter.
Figure 1 is consistent with the observations on income inequality and re-
distribution discussed in the introduction of the paper. It follows from the
hump-shaped relationship between income inequality and redistribution that
countries with low levels of pre-tax inequality might have higher tax rates
than countries with high levels of pre-tax inequality. Typically, however, em-
pirical investigations into the relation between inequality and redistribution
fail to generate very robust results. Our model also oﬀers an explanation to
why this may be the case. Our prediction is that the relation between in-
equality and redistribution is non-linear. Using a linear regression model to
capture this relationship would represent a functional form mis-specification,
which in turn would lead to biased estimators.
2.3 Increased pre-tax income inequality
As discussed in the introduction, globalisation is widely seen as causing in-
creased market income inequality. In our model this would mean an increase
in p. From equation (13) we see that an increase in p leads to an increase in
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taxation and redistribution for low initial levels of inequality, i.e. for p < p∗.
In this way, an increase in market income inequality will be partly oﬀset by
higher taxes. As the process of globalisation and increased pre-tax inequal-
ity increases, however, there will be a qualitative change in policies. When
pre-tax inequality is at a level higher than p∗, then an increase in pre-tax
inequality will be met by lower taxation. In this case, the changes in tax
policy will augment the eﬀect of globalisation on income inequality.
Comparing two countries with diﬀerent initial levels of pre-tax income
inequality, an increase in inequality may have a very diﬀerent eﬀect on dis-
posable income in the two countries. An increase in market income inequality
for a country characterized by p < p∗ will lead to higher taxes, which reduces
the impact on disposable incomes. Increased market income inequality for a
country characterized by p > p∗, on the other hand, will lead to a reduction
in taxes, thus reinforcing the impact on disposable income inequality.
It is commonly held that globalisation is a force of convergence between
countries’ tax rates. In our model we see that this is not necessarily true.
Consider, for instance, two countries characterized by i and ii in Figure 1.
The two countries have equal tax rates. Increased pre-tax inequality in both
countries leads to an increase in the tax rate of the country starting at point
i, and a reduced tax for the country starting at ii. Hence, globalisation will in
this case cause a divergence of tax rates between countries. This mechanism
provides a possible explanation for the diﬀerent responses to increased pre-
tax inequality in countries such as Canada and USA, Finland and the UK.
Note that increased pre-tax inequality in the present model may lead
to lower tax rates even if, in equilibrium, no tax payer actually chooses
to relocate. It is potential relocation of the tax base rather than actual
relocation that aﬀects the taxation and redistribution program. This is an
important point since it demonstrates that migration may be an important
constraint on redistribution policies even if we do not observe a lot of tax-
motivated relocation in practice.
2.4 Reduced mobility costs
An interesting question is how an increase in the mobility of the tax base,
captured by a reduction in m, aﬀects international diﬀerences in tax rates.
From (13) we see that a reduction in m reduces the slope of the t∗c-line. In
Figure 2 this eﬀect is captured by a change from t∗c to t
∗∗
c . This shift also
reduces p∗, in the figure from p∗1 to p
∗
2. The tax rate goes down for p > p
∗
2,
11
and remains unchanged for p < p∗2.
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Figure 2: Mobility cost and redistribution
A reduction in mobility costs may result in either convergence or diver-
gence of tax rates internationally. For two countries where both are charac-
terized by p > p∗2, a reduction in m causes the tax rates in the two countries
to become more similar. This is clear from the fact that the t∗c-line becomes
less steep. For two countries characterized by p < p∗2, a reduction in m either
does not aﬀect tax rates, or leads to a convergence, as the mobility constraint
becomes binding for the higher tax country and thus causes a reduction in
this country’s tax rate.
If one country is characterized by p < p∗2 and the other by p > p
∗
2, a
reduction in m may lead to either convergence or divergence of tax rates.
Clearly, as m approaches zero, there will be convergence, since tax rates in
both countries approach zero. To demonstrate the possibility of divergence,
consider a situation where one country is located in i and the other in ii, with
equal tax rates in both countries. A reduction in m now leads to a reduction
in the tax rate of the more inegalitarian country, to iii. Clearly, the reduction
inm in this case has led to a divergence of tax rates. This demonstrates that
not only an international increase in pre-tax income inequality, but also an
international reduction in mobility costs may lead to diverging outcomes
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between countries. This is important, given the diverging experiences of
countries’ redistribution policies reported in the introduction to the paper.
3 Conclusion
Market income inequality has risen in most OECD countries, and many at-
tribute this development to increased globalisation. Moreover, globalisation
also challenges the ability of the welfare state to implement ambitious tax
and redistribution programs. Empirically, we have witnessed a reduction
in the redistributional “eﬀorts” of governments. In some countries, like the
United States and the United Kingdom, the decline in redistributive policies
took place in the 1980s, and these two countries have seen a sharp increase
in disposable income inequality since then. Other countries, like Canada,
Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, etc., have managed to dampen the eﬀect
of globalisation on people’s disposable incomes. But there are signs that even
in these more egalitarian societies policies have changed since the mid-1990s,
leading to a sharper increase in disposable income inequality also there. The
present model oﬀers an explanation to these patterns of redistribution in a
time of increased market income inequality.
We show that the optimal tax rate might be a hump-shaped function of
pre-tax income inequality when there are fixed costs of mobility. Hence, as
the process of globalisation leads to increased pre-tax inequality, the political
economy response is first to limit the impact of market income inequality on
disposable incomes by increasing redistribution. As the process of global-
isation continues, however, there comes a point where the policy response
to increased market income inequality is to reduce taxes and transfers. Be-
yond this point, therefore, there will be a sharp increase in disposable income
inequality.
In our model, pre-tax incomes are exogenous. We have tied changes
in this exogenous variable to the process of globalisation. An interesting
extension would be to make not only taxation and redistribution but also pre-
tax incomes a function of policy choices. For instance, health, education, and
labor market policies may aﬀect pre-tax income distribution in interesting
ways. One interesting question is whether, in an era of globalisation, it
is more eﬃcient to try to equalize pre-tax incomes rather than after-tax
incomes. We leave this for future research.
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